Hokum-Balderdash Assay

Professor Don Howard in the December 2005 Physics Today article "Albert Einstein as a Philosopher of Science" shows how the scientist who revolutionized physics in the 20th century had extolled philosophy, how Einstein had deemed it important to science, and how he had steeped himself in the philosophy of science.

Skeptico asks, "Why does science exclude the supernatural?" As he rightly points out one very important reason is the nontestable/nonfalsifiable character of supernatural claims. We have already heard philosopher Barbara Forrest comment on this matter:

Any claim that depends on the supernatural ... is not falsifiable. [I]n science whatever claim you make has to be grounded in empirical evidence and you have to at least in principle know what kind of disconfirmation would show your theory to be wrong.... And so any position that's grounded in faith and the supernatural is one that by definition not falsifiable.

Geologist Arthur Strahler explains why the supernatural is outside the purview of science:

Religious tenets, which usually involve belief in supernatural entities, are ... beyond the limits of scientific appraisal.

[S]upernatural forces, if they can be said to exist, cannot be observed, measured, or recorded by the procedures of science--that's simply what the word "supernatural" means. There can be no limit to the kinds and shapes of supernatural forces and forms the human mind is capable of conjuring up "from nowhere." Scientists therefore have no alternative but to ignore the claims of the existence of supernatural forces and causes. This exclusion is a basic position that must be stoutly adhered to by scientists or their entire system of evaluating and processing information will collapse. (Arthur N. Strahler, Understanding Science: An Introduction to Concepts and Issues, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992, p. 13-14)

To get technical about it, science must exclude the supernatural because at its very foundation "science is committed to methodological naturalism (MN)," a position which "does not deny the existence of supernatural entities per se" but "simply assumes for the purpose of inquiry that they do not exist." In the same essay philosopher Michael Martin concludes that science's commitment to MN is warranted because it does not block inquiry, it is not a science-stopper unlike supernatural explanations. (Justifying Methodological Naturalism) 

Coincidentally, Unscrewing the Inscrutable has cogent things to say about MN:

The reason that scientists use MN when they are performing science is quite simply because it works. MN assumes that the natural world is all there is, then observes it and constructs hypotheses and theories that attempt to describe how a given naturally-observed phenomenon works. This is not to say that since MN presupposes a natural world, that there is no supernatural world. The question of whether or not a supernatural world exists just isn't ever addressed by MN. It can't be. That's why it's called "methodological naturalism" and not "methodological supernaturalism".

New Zealand is currently witnessing the gradual entrenchment of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (known as Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus in its home base, Brazil), a church which has alarmed not a few. One reason this church is sending the klaxons blaring is that it promotes the "seed-faith doctrine"--a rather suspicious system where members contribute an amount of money to the church with the expectation that there will be, supernaturally, a return on one's good act. In addition, the church lays emphasis on faith healing, a method it claims can cure major conditions such as AIDS, depression, epilepsy, and homosexuality. The UCKG "teaches that many physical and mental ailments are caused by demons or evil forces that can be exorcised through prayer." The full story: Church tells followers to use prayer, not medicine

The UCKG's proscription against medical treatment (if indeed it actively dissuades or prohibits its members from seeking medical attention) reminds me of the prohibition on blood transfusion by the Jehovah's Witnesses. In fairness, as far as I know, JW imposes no other medical restrictions on its members. (It is of interest that JW has over the years flip-flopped on its transfusion policy, and more recently qualified which portions of blood can and cannot be infused.)

There is no need to go into the efficacy of faith healing. There is as yet no good evidence that suggests it to be more effective than placeboes. Whatever cure or relief that is claimed to have been the result of faith healing can be attributed to naturalistic causes (q.v. CSICOP, among others)

What I'd like to scrutinize is the ethical dimension of refusing/rejecting medical treatment. Some questions that come to mind are: Is it right for a denomination/cult/church to proscribe well-substantiated treatments such as blood transfusions, antibiotics, vaccinations, surgery, transplants, etc., rationalizing that these conflict with their religious doctrines/beliefs? Is it right for parents to refuse treatment for their child who's suffering from acute appendicitis on the grounds that their religion expressly forbids surgery, even if such treatment will save her/his life? (Legally, of course, there are societies which recognize the right of a person to refuse medical treatment on religious grounds. But I limit myself to the sphere of ethics).

In a multicultural and global society this conflict of values gives rise to ethical dilemmas. In such a tinderbox situation what ought to take priority? The life of the person or the choice/right to forgo with available medical treatment? To what extent should religious beliefs supersede? In literally life-and-death situations who decides for the child? The child? The parents? Their church? Society at large? In general, the question I'd like to address is whether religious belief is justification enough to warrant a person from refusing medical treatment.

Mathematician W.K. Clifford has a famous statement which is germane to this issue:

It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.

Vis-a-vis a religious doctrine such as "God forbids the use of medical treatment X," Clifford would have us inquire, What evidence do we have that a certain entity called God exists and that He/She/It commands its devotees to forgo with X? If there is little or no evidence other than archaic writings that claim to be the commandments of a deity, then Clifford would assert that it is unethical to harbor such a belief, particularly because such a belief could unnecessarily endanger the life of its believers. Indeed, why should we believe something and put our or another person's life on the line for something which we do not know is true, and more so for an extraordinary claim such as the above? It is not rational.

In epistemology, the classic definition of knowledge is "justified true belief." In other words, we know Y if (a) we believe in Y, (b) Y is true, and (c) we can justify our belief in Y. Just to explain the two latter criteria: A belief is true if what we believe in is factual, and a belief is justified if we have good reasons to believe in it.

An example: I claim that Gus is at this very moment surfing the Net. Do I have knowledge that this is so? It all depends. If I'm merely guessing then I don't have knowledge. If I'm guessing and Gus is not surfing the Net, then obviously I'm dead wrong--my belief is false. But even if I'm lucky and Gus is in fact online at this moment, I still don't have knowledge. My belief is true but it is not justified--guesswork is not a justification. On the other hand, if Gus is indeed online and if my reason for saying so is that Gus is in the same Internet cafe as I am and I can see him drooling over an adult site, then I have knowledge that Gus is surfing the Net--my belief is true in fact and is justified by good sufficient reason/evidence.

I brought in the definition of knowledge so as to weigh religious belief Z against it. In declaring our belief in Z, we would need to ask ourselves whether Z is justified. What reasons and evidence do we have to support our belief in Z? If we have merely anecdotal/hearsay evidence--such as claims by some person or some tribe many hundreds or thousands of years ago--then we do not have good or sufficient justification to say that we have knowledge. When this is the case, and bringing in Clifford's dictum, it would be unethical to believe in Z. Furthermore, in accordance with David Hume's dictum to proportion our belief to the evidence, it is only rational to weigh in on the side of skepticism and put in a good measure of doubt as to the veracity of this commandment/doctrine Z.

Thus, on the grounds that one ought not to believe on insufficient evidence, to refuse a certain necessary medical treatment because it is proscribed by a supernatural entity is not warranted, not justified. One may have other reasons for rejecting medical treatment but in the case we're perusing there has to be sufficient and good reasons for believing that Z is true.

How does one prove that a certain phenomenon X is supernatural rather than natural? If we can prove that X is non-natural then we can call it supernatural. The task for us then is to prove that X is not-natural.

1. This to me seems next to impossible unless we have complete and absolute knowledge of all natural processes. Only if we have omniscience of the natural world and were faced with some event/phenomenon X which is inexplicable naturalistically can we safely arrive at the conclusion that X is supernatural. But is such omniscience even forthcoming?

Given that our knowledge of the universe if far from complete and far from infallible (just look at the new discoveries being made at this very moment in astronomy courtesy of the Mars rovers Spirit and Opportunity and the Saturn probe Cassini-Huygens), there is no good justification for an extraordinary event/phenomenon or an "anomaly" to be drafted as evidence for the supernatural. In all probability, as history shows, what is baffling and inexplicable today will be understood sometime in the future and may even become common knowledge in the centuries hence. For anyone to claim that an extraordinary event (e.g. the weeping statue in Civitavecchia, Italy that is now being touted as an authentic supernatural phenomenon) is inexplicable naturalistically and therefore is supernatural is to commit the fallacy of appeal to ignorance (argumentum ad ignorantiam). If we don't understand something it does not mean it is supernatural. It simply means we don't know what it is. It is ignorance of clear thinking that trips people into claiming that human ignorance of the nature of X implies its being supernatural.

2. Some may proffer the claim that a deity had engineered X such that X would look natural in every way and not at all supernatural. For instance the Catholic dogma of Transubstantiation tells us that before the Host is consecrated it is merely bread both in substance and appearance (accidents). But after the consecration its substance is changed (into someone's flesh perhaps?) while its appearance remains the same. In other words, after the priest has performed the necessary ritual, the unleavened bread no longer is bread but if tested by anyone and any laboratory it will be found to look, taste, feel, smell like bread and will have exactly the same molecular structure and physical and chemical properties as it had before the consecration. In fact there is no way to distinguish between the "before" and the "after." If during the Sacrament of the Eucharist consecrated and unconsecrated wafers accidentally got mixed together there is no way to identify, and thus separate one from the other.

If X is claimed to be supernatural but supernaturally engineered to look natural then X can never be proved to be supernatural or supernaturally caused. Such an untestable claim marks it as an ad hoc explanation which prevents any further meaningful discussion or treatment of the matter. Nothing can be brought to bear upon it to prove or disprove it. It is a claim and will remain merely an untestable claim. It does not bring us anywhere closer to the truth. It does not increase our understanding. If such an ad hoc explanation/hypothesis is believed in, then such belief is not rational for there is no good reason to believe in it--there is no evidence to support it.

3. One can cite examples of direct revelation from deities. Surely a personal revelation from a god or the supernatural realm is more than enough proof. Unfortunately, many have claimed to have had revelations and not a few of these communications are delusions or hallucinations. Those who are extremely prone to such phenomena are not infrequently admitted to certain types of institutions we would rather not find ourselves confined in.

The mere fact that we dream should make us wary of such "revelations." How many of us have not had dreams and nightmares that had to be true, that gripped us so completely, that were so emotionally compelling that we knew it had to be a premonition or something we simply could not ignore? I have had my fair share of such compelling dreams. But how many of these actually came true or were of any significance in the coming days and years? We know only too well that our psyche is extremely active. Moreover, psychedelic substances both natural and synthetic and deprivation of all sorts--including sensory deprivation, hunger/fasting, sleep loss, extended solitude, etc.--can cause the mind to produce hallucinations and go into altered states of consciousness. We also know that we are extremely prone to perceptual and attribution errors. The voices and images in my head seem real enough. And I interpret them to be coming from deities. But how do I know that I am right, in my perception and interpretation?

Claims of having received direct communication from supernatural entities are not proof of the supernatural. At best we can say that these psychological phenomena are interpreted by these subjects as having supernatural origins, just as from time to time we have dreams that are so bizarre or moving that we can't imagine how it could've come from us, how our minds/psyche could've written/produced/directed such stories. Again, if we don't understand a phenomenon, it does not imply supernatural origins. Our implacable need for certainty, for knowledge, and our ignorance of the complexity of nature including and particularly human nature, makes us jump the gun and reach for the catch-all hypotheses--the supernatural and the paranormal.

Given the above, can we conclude that there is no way for us to prove that X is supernatural unless we have absolute and complete knowledge of the natural world (including of course knowledge of human psychology and neurology)? Much as I would like to answer in the affirmative I will have to leave that question to the experts for there may yet be a way to prove X without human omniscience of our universe. Much as I deem our still inadequate and incomplete understanding of the universe a very strong case for the unprovability of the supernatural, I am leery of jumping the gun myself. A real philosopher (rather than an armchair philosopher like me--or is there such a thing as a non-armchair philosopher?) may be able to shed more light on this matter.